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TEXAS LAW AND LEGISLATION [Vol. 1
SHOULD TEXAS PERMIT COMMENT BY THE JUDGE ON
THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE?
I
A T common law it was generally recognized that the trial judge
could properly comment upon the evidence in the presence
of the jury, with a few decisions suggesting that it was his duty
to comment as well as his privilege.' He was permitted to analyze
and sum up the evidence as presented by both parties in the case;
in fact the only well-defined limitation upon his privilege of com-
ment seems to have been the requirement of an instruction that
the ultimate determination of the issues was for the jury.2 This
common-law power of comment by the judge was justified accord-
ing to Sir Matthew Hale, for the reason that
"Herein he is able, on matters of law, emerging upon the evidence
to direct them, and also, in matters of fact, to give them great light and
assistance by his weighing of the evidence before them, and observing
where the question and knot of of the business lies, and by showing
them his opinion even in a matter of fact; which is a great advantage
and light to lay-men."'
Inasmuch as such was the practice at common law at the time of
the adoption of the constitution of the United States4 and of the
1 State v. Bennett, 2 Treadw. 692 (S. C. 1815); see Graham v. United.States, 12 F.
(2d) 717, 718 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926) ; Pfaff v. United States, 85 F. (2d) 309, 311 (C. C. A.
7th, 1936) ; State v. Hummer, 73 N. J. Law 714, 716, 65 AtI. 249, 251 (1906) ; State v.
Casados, 1 N. & McC. 91. 98 (S. C. 1818) : 3 Bt.. COMM. '373-5. Contra: State v. Bis-
sonnette, 83 Conn. 261, 76 Atil. 288 (1910). But see Allen v. United States, 4 F. (2d) 688
(C. C. A. 7th, 1925).
2Carver v. Jackson, 4 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1830) ; Magniac v. Thompson, 7 Pet. 348 (U. S.
1833) ; Tracy and Balestier v. Swartwout, 10 Pet. 80 (U. S. 1836).
3 HALE, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND (6th ed. 1820) 346.
4Trial by jury as guaranteed by the United States Constitution (U. S. CONST. Art.
III, § 2) means a trial by jury as understood and applied at common law, and includes
all of the essential elements as they were recognized in this country and England when
the Constitution was adopted. Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 288 (1930).
COMMENT ON THE EVIDENCE
first state constitutions, it became the early practice in the states
to permit the judge to advise the jury on the facts and the evidence
The movement away from this procedure began in 1796 in North
Carolina when a statute was enacted abrogating the common-law
rule.' The Tennessee constitution of the same year embodied a like
limitation, ' and in 1836 Arkansas adopted such a provision in its
constitution.' This tendency away from the long established com-
mon-law practice was the result of a growing lack of confidence in
the ability of the judges of the period, and was aided in part by
ignorance in developing areas that the restriction on the judge's
comment was a local innovation and not the common law. Regard-
less of the reasons for the movement in favor of limitation on com-
ment the newer practice came to be so widely accepted in the
jurisdictions of the United States that at one time only ten jurisdic-
tions followed the common-law rule." The states attained this result
by the several methods of constitutional amendment, statutory
enactment, or judicial decision. The constitutionality of the statutes
prohibiting comment, as well as of those allowing comment, has
been questioned,"0 and the courts have generally held that the denial
of this power does not violate the constitutional guarantee of trial
by jury which preserves onlythe substance of the right rather than
the procedural elements. This departure from the orthodox com-
mon-law rule has been viewed by Wigmore as having contributed
more than any other single factor to the impairment of the efficiency
of the jury trial as an instrument of justice."
5 Shank v. State, 25 Ind. 207 (1865) ; People v. Genung, 11 Wend. 18 (N. Y. 1833);
Devlin v. Kilcrease, 2 McMul. 425 (S. C. 1842); see Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How.
115, 131 (U. S. 1851).
6 State v. Moses, 2 Dev. 452 (N. C. 1829).
7 TENN. CONsT. (1796) Art. V, § 5'.
sANK. CONST. (1836) Art. VII, § 12.
o Federal, Connecticut, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont. See Johnson, Province of the Judge in Jury
Trials (1928) 14 MASS. L. Q. 48.
10 People v. Kelly, 347 II. 221, 179 N. E. 898 (1931) ; see Wigmore, All Legislative
Rules for Judiciary Procedure Are Void Constitutionally (1928) 23 ILL. L. REv. 276.
12 9 WIcMOiE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 2551.
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Notwithstanding the tendency in the state courts, the federal
courts have adhered to the common-law rule from the beginning
and with the express approval of the Supreme Court of the United
States.' 2 Moreover in recent years several states have adopted the
older practice of allowing the judge to comment." What may well
be a movement toward adoption of the orthodox procedure has re-
ceived impetus, in part, from the decisions defining limitations
upon the scope of the rule as applied in both federal and state
courts." For example in United States v. Meltzer," the federal
courts departed from established doctrine' in holding that com-
ment by the trial judge on the ultimate issue to be decided by the
jury, when the facts were in dispute, exceeded the bounds of per-
missible comment and was a deprivation of the constitutional right
of trial by jury. Generally, however, the decisions have recognized
merely the limitations that have been inherent in the rule since
its formulation, i.e., that the judge's comment must be fair and
dispassionate," without heat or partisanship 8 or argumentation,"'
and must be confined to and supported by the record,2" with the jury
free to perform its function independently' after having been
12 Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1 (1898).
1s People v. Ottey, 5 Cal. (2d) 714, .56 P. (2d) 193 (1936) ; Kolkman v. People, 89
Colo. 8, 300 Pac. 575 (1931) ; State v. Oehoa, 41 N. M. 589, 72 P. (2d) 609 (1937);
People v. Lewis, 264 Mich. 83, 240 N. W. 451 (1933).
14 Quercia v. United States, 289 U. S. 466 (1933) ; United States v. Murdock, 290
U. S. 389 (1933); United States v. Marzano, 149 F. (2d) 923 (C.C.A. 2d, 1945); La
Rosa v. United States, 15 F. (2d) 479 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926), People v. Dail, 22 Cal.(2d) 642, 140 P. (2d) 828 (1943); People v. Lintz, 244 Mich. 603, 222 N. W. 201
(1928); People v. Padgett, 306 Mich. 545, 11 N. W. (2d) 235 (1943); State v. Ochoa,
41 N. M. 589, 72 P. (2d) 609 (1937); Commonwealth v. Wiswesser, 124 Penn. 251,
188 At. 604 (1936).
"5 United States v. Meltzer, 100 F. (2d) 739 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938).
16 Simmons v. United States, 142 U. S. 148 (1891).
IT Frantz v. United States, 62 F. (2d) 737 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933).
'SGraham v. United States, 12 F. (2d) 717 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926).
'o Weare v. United States, 1 F. (2d) 617 (C. C. A. 6th, 1901).
20 Mullen V. United States, 106 Fed. 892 (C. C. A. 6th, 1901).
21 Hickory v. United States, 160 U. S. 408 (1896).
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informed that it is sole judge of the facts." Inasmuch as the com-
ment is allowed in order that the judge may give assistance to the
jury, mere statements as to the court's belief in the guilt or inno-
cence of the accused, without an apt analysis of the evidence,
should be precluded as failing to offer aid to the jury. Moreover,
such limitations are believed not to have impaired the usefulness of
the judge's comment for the purpose for which it is intended.
II
The influence of Tennessee and the other states which had de-
parted from the common-law practice of permitting comment was
felt in Texas as early as 1846 when the Legislature enacted a
statute providing that the judge should not charge nor comment
upon the weight of the evidence in either civil or criminal cases. '3
It may be doubted whether the early Texas lawmakers realized that
they had deviated from the common-law procedure of comment by
the judge, inasmuch as the "North Carolina jury trial," which had
originated a mere fifty years before, had become the general rule
rather than the exception.
The Texas Constitution of 1876 guarantees the right of trial by
jury and empowers the legislature to pass laws to maintain its
"purity and efficiency."' The present Code of Criminal Procedure
provides that the jury "are the exclusive judges of the facts25 and
of the weight to be given to the testimony;" ' that the judge shall
22 Starr v. United States, 153 U. S. 614 (1894).
'3 Tex. Laws 1846, p. 390, 2 LAWS OF TEXAS (Gammel, 1898) 1696.
24 TEX. CoNsr. (1876) Art. 1, § 15: "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolat',.
The Legislature shall pass such laws as may be needed to regulate the same, and to
maintain its purity and efficiency."
25 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. (1925) art. 657: "The jury are the exclusive judges of the
facts, but they are bound to receive the law from the court and be governed thereby."
26 Id., art. 706: "The jury, in all cases, are the exclusive judges of the facts proved,
and of the weight to be given to the testimony, except where it is provided by law that
proof of any particular fact is to be taken as either conclusive or presumptive proof of
the existence of another fact, or where the law directs that a certain degree of weight is
to be attached to a certain species of evidence."
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not comment when deciding on the admissibility of evidence, -7
nor shall he express any opinion upon the weight of the evidence."
By these enactments the judge has been made a mere moderator of
the trial.
The courts on a few occasions, however, seem to have gone far
in holding the judge's comment not to constitute reversible error.
These holdings are generally based on the reasoning that the com-
ment, although on the evidence, was not injurious to the appellant's
cause. u" However, such decisions are few in number when com-
pared to the many cases in which seemingly less significant com-
ments have been held to be unauthorized comment on the weight
or credibility of the evidence and result in a reversal. The extent
to which the Court of Criminal Appeals has gone in preventing
comment under the Code provisions is indicated by the decisions
establishing that such comment is reversible error if it states that
the evidence is proof of a fact,"0 that it is very material" or that
•-7 Id., art. 707: "In ruling upon the admissibility of evidence, the Judge shall not
discuss or comment upon the weight of the same or its bearing in the case, but shall
simply decide whether or not it is admissible; nor shall he at any stage of the proceed.
ings previous to the return of a verdict, make any remark calculated to convey to the
jury his opinion of the case."
" Id., art. 658: "In each felony case the judge shall before the argument begins,
deliver to the Jury, except in pleas of guilty where a Jury has been waived, a written
charge, distinctly setting forth the law applicable to the case; not expressing any
opinion as to the weight of the evidence, not summing up the testimony, discussing the
facts or using any argument in his charge calculated to arouse the sympathy or excite
the passions of the Jury. Before said charge is read to the Jury, the defendant or his
Counsel shall have a reasonable time to examine the same and he shall present his
objections thereto in writing, distinctly specifying each ground of objection."
25 McGee v. State, 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 668, 40 S. W. 967 (1897) (in order to require
a reversal under such circumstances the action of the court must be reasonable calcu-
lated to operate prejudicially to the accused) ; Herridge v. State, 127 Tex. Crim. Rep.
284, 76 S. W. (2d) 522 (1934) ; Bevins v. State, 110 Tex. Crim. Rep. 52, 7 S. W. (2d)
532 (1928); West v. State, 116 Tex. Crim. Rep. 468, 34 S. W. (2d) 253 (1930) ; Wel-
burn v. State, 129 Tex. Crim. Rep. 323, 87 S. W. (2d) 259 (1935) ; English v. State, 85
Tex. Crim. Rep. 450, 213 S. W. 632 (1919) ; c/. Brady v. State, 116 Tex. Crim. Rep. 427,
34 1. W. (2d) 587 (19311 ; Jones v. State, 131 Tex. Crim. Rep. 650, 101 S. W. (2d) 265
(1937).
30 Secrest v. State, 38 Tex. trim. Rep. 43, 40 S. W. 988 (1897).
31 Coleman v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. Rep. 297, 235 S. W. 898 (1921).
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it is immaterial, 2 that it is of less importance than other evidence,"3
that it corroborates or reenforces the testimony of another witness,"'
or that the testimony is admitted for the purpose of showing the
existence of a particular fact." The wording of the statutes is alto-
gether plain and precludes any participation by the judge in the
trial by way of comment or opinion as to the evidence. However,
it is thought that the court has gone beyond the letter and the spirit
of the statute in interpreting Article 707 of the Code in several
cases' including the recent case of Wilson v. State. 7 It has been
held in these decisions that the trial judge's statement in his charge
concerning the admission of testimony from an impeaching wit-
ness, that the testimony was admitted for impeachment purposes
only or to affect credibility and that the jury should not consider
it for any other purpose, is a comment on the evidence and consti-
tutes reversible error. However, the Court's decisions have not been
consistent in this matter; there are cases in which similar instruc-
tions have been held not to be an expression of the court's opinion
as to the legal effect or weight of the evidence, but merely a restric-
tion limiting the jury's use of such evidence to the purpose for
which it was proffered and admitted."
III
The proposal for acceptance of the historic common-law proced-
ure permitting comment by the judge has been approved in recent
years by various organizations concerned with recommendations
32 Sack-heim v. State, 94 Tex. Crim. Rep. 43, 249 S. W. 867 (1923).
33 Gribble v. State, 85 Tex. Crim. Rep. 52, 210 S. W. 215 (1919).
34 Bradshaw v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 222, 70 S. W. 215 (1902).
35 Niles v. State, 104 Tex. Crim. Rep. 447, 284 S. W. 568 (1926).
38 Taylor v. State, 50 Tex. Crim. Rep. 560, 100 S. W. 393 (1907) ; Lozano v. State,
83 Tex. Crim. Rep. 174, 202 S. W. 510 (1918) ; cf. Stull v. State, 47 Tex. Crim. Rep. 547,
84S. W. 1059 (1905).
3 Wilson v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. Rep. 424, 145 S. W. (2d) 890 (1940).
38 Rodgers v. State, 91 Tex. Crim. Rep. 38, 236 S. W. 748 (1921) ; Campbell v. State,
92 Tex. Crim. Rep. 12, 240 S. W. 937 (1922) ; Edwards v. State, 80 Tex. Crim. Rep. 485,
191 S. W. 542 (1917).
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for the improvement of criminal procedure. The Model Code of
Evidence adopted by the American Law Institute in 1942 contained
the following provision:
"After the close of the evidence and arguments of counsel the judge
may sum up the evidence and comment to the jury upon the weight of
the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, if he instructs thejury that they are to determine for themselves the weight of the evi-
dence and the credit to be given to the witnesses and are not bound by
the judges comment thereon." '
A similar recommendation was made by the American Law Insti-
tute in the Code of Criminal Procedure adopted in 1930."°The
principal benefit to be derived from allowing such comment would
be its aid to the jury in reaching just verdicts. A trained and ex-
perienced judge is better able to analyze complicated factual
situations and correctly apply the law thereto. Moreover, the judge
is the only person qualified to perform this function in a trial who
is unbiased; the attorneys are qualified but partisan, while the
jury is unbiased but unqualified. Thus it would seem that criminal
justice would be served by a removal of restrictions which necessi-
tate a loss of the benefit of the judge's competence by making of
him nothing more than a referee. Among other benefits to the
judicial process which would follow from allowing comment by
the judge are a reduction in the number of new trials, and a speed-
ing up of the trial, since counsel would be less exacting in selecting
a jury and would spend less time in impanelling the jury, and since
the deliberations of the jury would be less prolonged. Finally it
has been suggested that the opportunity to make such comment
39 E.g., New York Committee on the Administration of Justice and the American
Bar Association Committee on Improvement of the Rules of Evidence. See AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL CODE OF EvDrNcE (1942) Rule 8.
411 AMERICAN LAW INSTTIITV.. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROC.nEiD (1930) § 325. part 1:
"The court shall instruct the jury regarding the law applicable to the facts of the cause,
and may make such comment on the evidence and the testimony and credibility of any
witness as in its opinion is necesary for the proper determination of the cause. It shall
if requested inform the joiry that they are the exclusive judges of all qviestions of fact
and. whether reircsted or not. the court shall so inform them if it comments on the
evidence, the testimony or the credibility of any witnes.."
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would prove an incentive to the trial judge to pay greater attention
to the course of the trial.
Resistance to proposals for allowing comment perhaps finds its
origin in a fear that the judge may misuse the privilege and invade
the province of the jury. The limitations on the comment at com-
mon-law as developed in this country should, however, offer an
adequate safeguard.
lack Berry.
